Spinor Info

According to Hungarian media reports, denied by some members of the ruling Fidesz party, but confusingly, confirmed even by some pro-government newspapers, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, told his supporters at a party meeting that there was an international conspiracy attempt, led by CNN (!), to carry out a coup d’etat against his government.

If these reports are true, they prompt me to ask three questions.

First, to Mr. Orban: My good man, have you gone stark raving mad?

Second, to the leadership of Fidesz: Why do you allow yourselves to be led by a person who has obviously gone stark raving mad?

To supporters of Mr. Orban and his party who actually believe his cockamamie conspiracy theories: have you all gone stark raving mad?

Well, perhaps the reports are false after all. As a matter of fact, I’d certainly like to believe that they are false. But they ring true. In recent months, Hungary’s government dismissed all Western criticisms as mere results of an organized liberal or socialist conspiracy by “enemies of Hungary” in the country and abroad. Support for Mr. Orban within his party is unwavering; indeed, support for Mr. Orban seems to have been the central program theme of this party for the past two decades. And Mr. Orban’s supporters recently held a pro-government rally, holding up signs protesting attempts to turn Hungary into a “colony of Europe”.

Colony? No way. Insane asylum of Europe, perhaps.

It’s now the Washington Post’s turn to denounce Prime Minister Orban’s increasingly autocratic government in Hungary, and rightly so: they say things such as “the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban now more resembles the autocratic regimes of Russia and Belarus than fellow E.U. democracies”, and I couldn’t agree more.

Surprisingly, I see fewer and fewer voices from Hungary denouncing such outbursts in Western media as the work of some internationally financed (a code phrase for Jewish) liberal bolshevik cryptocommunist conspiracy.

I find watching Mr. Orban’s performance especially painful. For starters, I expect more from people whose first name I share. He is also almost exactly the same age as I am. For all I know, we may have run into one another in Budapest several times in the 1970s or early 1980s. I am trying to make sense of his autocratic tendencies, and the only explanation I can come up with is that he truly distrusts anyone who thinks differently. Since he views himself as a democrat, people who disagree with him must be antidemocratic by definition; therefore, paradoxically, in order to protect democracy he must silence his opposition. But who protects democracy from democrats? A stable system of institutions, that’s who, but unfortunately it’s precisely this system of of institutions in Hungary that Mr. Orban has very effectively dismantled in the past two years.

The damage will be lasting: even if Mr. Orban’s party were swept from power tomorrow, it will take decades to rebuild what he destroyed, grossly abusing his extraordinary parliamentary supermajority. I do not envy Hungarians who must suffer the consequences of Mr. Orban’s dilettantish by determined (a phrase attributed to a former Hungarian PM, Gordon Bajnai) economic policies, but I also do not envy future leaders of Hungary who will face the nearly hopeless task of rebuilding what the Orban government destroyed.

The parliament of Hungary approved a new constitution.

Too bad that it’s a constitution designed the serve the interests of a single party and its predominantly Christian conservative ideology, as opposed to serving the interests of the nation by strengthening the system of democratic institutions, of checks and balances. And this time around, they can’t even blame foreign occupation as the cause… this wondrous piece of legalese wasn’t drafted in Vienna or Moscow or anywhere else.

One party-rule, proclaims The Guardian in its latest article about Hungary, and they’re not that terribly far from the truth: It seems to me that Mr. Orban is trying to build precisely that, demonstrating that of all Hungarian politicians, he is the one who bears the true legacy of the Kadar era. Indeed I think that this is the best way to describe Orban: he is Kadar’s posthumous revenge.

For many years, I felt that despite their “anti-communist” political rhetoric and right-of-center stand on many issues, it is Hungary’s Fidesz party that carries the true legacy of the communist era. The party’s leader, Prime Minister Viktor Orban, seems hell-bent on governing in the style of one-party regimes, and now that he enjoys a two thirds parliamentary majority, he has the mandate to do so.

Even so, I did not expect that they will show their true nature this boldly and this rapidly, causing concern even among international investors, as they expressed their intent to curb the jurisdiction of the country’s constitutional court, which happened to declare one of their recent measures unconstitutional.

Hungary’s right-wing FIDESZ political party achieved a two thirds parliamentary majority this spring, ending eight years of Socialist rule.

Many predicted that once FIDESZ was in power, especially with a two thirds majority that allows them to modify the country’s constitution without opposition support, they will turn their back on democracy. While I had no illusions about the FIDESZ leader, Viktor Orban (he may be portraying himself as the leader of pro-democracy, anti-Communist forces but all too often, his behavior and mannerisms remind me of the country’s pre-1989 Kadar-era elite), I had no such worries: political parties come and go, but 20 years after the collapse of Communism, the democratic institutions of Hungary, a member of the European Union, seemed solid and stable.

Now I am not so certain. FIDESZ introduced a media bill in Parliament that seems to confirm some of the worst fears of their opponents. Is Orban really aspiring to become Europe’s next Lukasenko? I wish I could answer that question with a firm negative.

I keep telling myself that I should not care. I live in Canada, and while I may occasionally doubt Stephen Harper’s prowess as Prime Minister, I have no reason to doubt his commitment to democracy. So why should I care about what happens in a teeny little country in the backwaters of Europe, full of delusions of grandeur and outdated, obsolete political ideals worshiped by its “Christian middle class”?

And, truth to tell, I care less and less. I still care because my parents live there and might suffer as a result of a government gone berserk. And, I occasionally meet Hungarian expats here who don’t realize that 1956 was more than half a century ago as they celebrate the “defeat of the Reds”. (Replaying a revolution that never happened was a recurring theme in the FIDESZ political rhetoric, too.) Other than that… if the majority of Hungarians really believe that this is the route to the country’s salvation, well, enjoy.

I’ve known the name of Eduardo Rozsa-Flores, as I’ve read his memoirs, published in the 1990s, about his participation in the Yugoslav war. He’s of Hungarian-Bolivian descent, described as an adventurer, writer, publicist, and journalist (among other things) by the Hungarian edition of Wikipedia.

He was certainly a strange and colorful character, but nonetheless, I did not expect him to be shot dead by Bolivian police in an alleged plot to assassinate the Bolivian president, Evo Morales. Was Rozsa-Flores really an assassin, or is it just another sign of the deterioration of the Bolivian republic under the rule of an, ahem, colorful individual in the role of president? Maybe we will find out one day. I’m not holding my breath.